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AIRLINES IN DISTRESS:
CAN THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY
CORPORATION WEATHER THIS CRISIS?
INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself as a pilot who has been employed by a major U.S.
airline for over thirty years. You are quickly approaching retirement
and are looking forward to spending time with your family, wood-
working in your garage, and traveling to exotic locations. Although
your pension will make your budget a little tighter, you are confident
that with careful planning you can live the life you desire. One day,
you pick up the paper to find that your dreams are in jeopardy; your
employer has announced that it is terminating its pension plans. You
know that there is a federal agency that ensures pension plans, but
you also recall that this will mean a substantial reduction in the
amount of benefits you receive annually. Numbly, you wonder what
will happen now.
In the days shortly before the passage of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA),1 its proponents had high hopes that
this legislation would add much needed security to the nation's ailing
pension plans.2 But thirty years after the 1974 enactment of ERISA,
there are many who would argue that pension plans today are almost
as insecure as they were in the 1960s and 1970s when major compa-
nies, like the Studebaker-Packard Corporation (Studebaker), declared
bankruptcy and ended their pension plans.3 United Airline's (United)
1. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
2. Sharon Reece, Enron: The Final Straw & How to Build Pensions of Brick, 41 DuQ. L. REV.
69, 69-70 (2002) (citing 120 CONG. REC. 29,243 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits)).
3. Leigh Allyson Wolfe, Is Your Pension Safe? A Call for Reform of the Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation and Protection of Pension Benefits, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 145, 146 (1994). On the
other hand, the successes of ERISA cannot be denied. The Department of Labor claims that
there has been a general increase in funding rates since 1974. Mark Daniels, Pensions in Peril:
Single Employer Pension Plan Terminations in the Context of Corporate Bankruptcies, 9 HoF-
STRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 25, 37 (1991) (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR PENSION & WELFARE
ADMINISTRATION, TRENDS IN PENSIONS 119-20 (J. Turner & D. Belier eds., 1989)). Before the
enactment of ERISA, "only about one-third of all plans held assets sufficient to pay all accrued
benefits due upon termination. However, by 1985 almost three-quarters of all plans had a suffi-
cient level of assets to pay termination liabilities." Id. Currently, most plans are adequately
funded. Id.
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July 2004 announcement that it would stop paying into its pension
plan underscores this argument.4
In December 2002, United announced that it was entering Chapter
11 bankruptcy proceedings. 5 In 2004, while in Chapter 11, United was
to pay $500 million in pension contributions and owe another four
billion dollars by 2008.6 On June 28, 2004, a federal loan board turned
down United's request for $1.6 billion in assistance.7 A month later,
on July 23, 2004, United announced that it would no longer contribute
to its four pension plans during bankruptcy.8 Some experts estimated
that if United terminated its plans, United could save as much as three
billion dollars.9 On July 26, 2004, the U.S. government challenged
United's actions by declaring that the airline was "violating federal
law by suspending $568 million in payments to its pension plans." 10 A
few weeks later, on August 13, 2004, the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC), the federal agency that guarantees the pension
plans, formally announced that it would move to prevent United's ac-
tions. 1 Currently, the PBGC has assumed responsibility for United's
pension plans.1 2
4. Greg Griffin, Feds Say United Violating the Law: The Airline's Suspension of Contributions
Raises the Specter of Reduced Benefits for Its Retirees, DENY. POST, July 27, 2004, at Al, available
at 2004 WLNR 1003641.
5. Micheline Maynard, Notes Shed Some Light on Panel Decisions To Deny Aid to United,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004, at C4. A Chapter 11 bankruptcy is not necessarily the end of a
company, but rather just the opposite:
By filing a chapter 11 petition ... the managers of a company indicate their hope that
the business will continue. The managers further indicate that they are no longer capa-
ble of operating the company under normal conditions, and therefore need the protec-
tion of a law tailored to permit operation of a business under distressed conditions. A
financially distressed company in reorganization inevitably will make operational deci-
sions that will directly affect the wages, benefits, and job security of its employees.
Donald R. Korobkin, Employee Interests in Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 12
(1996). In contrast, under a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the company will be terminated. Daniels,
supra note 3, at 64. The main goal of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy is to distribute a company's assets
to its creditors. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (1998)).
6. David Lazarus, United's Pension Dilemma, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 25, 2004, at Cl, available at
2004 WLNR 7634935.
7. Maynard, supra note 5.
8. Griffin, supra note 4.
9. Caroline Daniel, UAL Steps Up Pace of Change: Airline Must Do More to Impress Credi-
tors and the Government, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2004, at 25. If United terminates its current de-
fined benefits plans, it may use defined contribution plans instead, which would only cost about
$1 billion over four years. Id.
10. Griffin, supra note 4.
11. US Pension Agency Moves Against United Airlines Over Pension Funding, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESS, Aug. 13, 2004, available at www.westlaw.com.
12. Press Release, Pension Guarnty Benefit Corporation, PBGC Will Assume Ground Em-
ployee Pension Plan at UAL (Mar. 11, 2005), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/news/press-
releases/2005/prO5_30.htm.
AIRLINES IN DISTRESS
Spurred in large part by United's actions, the collapse of steel com-
panies in the 1990s, and the overall instability of many industries using
defined benefit plans, many economists and politicians have advo-
cated ERISA reform. 13 Several of these proposed revisions are
geared toward ensuring the survival of the PBGC.14 This Comment
proposes that raising the PBGC's status in bankruptcy will ensure the
long-term survival of the PBGC and best protect the employees of the
airline industry. Part II of this Comment provides a brief overview of
ERISA, the PBGC, and several of the recent issues regarding defined
benefit plans that are gaining national attention because of the current
airline industry crisis. 15 Part III examines two proposed reforms relat-
ing to the PBGC: modifying the variable-rate premium structure and
raising the PBGC's priority status in bankruptcy proceedings so that
the PBGC is able to place liens on the company's assets while it is in
bankruptcy. 16 This Comment analyzes each of these proposed re-
forms by examining the flaws in the current structure as well as the
pros and cons of each solution. This Comment then proposes ele-
ments of an "ideal solution" and ultimately advocates that raising the
PBGC's status in bankruptcy best satisfies these elements.17 Part IV
examines the current status quo of the airline industry and the effect
that this Comment's proposed reform will have on different airlines,
airline employees, and the PBGC.18 Part V concludes that while rais-
ing the PBGC's status in bankruptcy would be difficult for United, it
13. For example, when United Airlines and US Airways announced that they would terminate
their pension plans, the PBGC said it would guarantee the pension benefits for these airlines'
employees but noted that "we need fundamental reforms to improve the financial health of the
defined benefit pension system, to protect participants' benefits, and to shore up the federal
pension insurance system." PBGC, PBGC Calls for Pension Protections: Actions of US Airways
and UAL underscore need for fix (Sept. 14, 2004), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/news/press
release/2004/prO4_65.htm [hereinafter Pension Protections]. David M. Walker, Comptroller
General of the United States, stated that:
[T]he problems of underfunded pension plans extend far beyond the airline industry, to
steel, automotive related manufacturing and other sectors of the economy that sponsor
defined benefit (DB) plans. Thus, policymakers must seek both short-term and long-
term pension solutions that balance the interests of these industries' active and retired
employees, customers, and stockholders, the PBGC, and American taxpayers.
The Financial Situation of the Airlines: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of Commerce, Sci., and
Transp., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of David Walker, Comptroller of the United States)
[hereinafter Walker statement] available at www.lexisnexis.com.
14. The scope of this Comment will be limited to single-employer situations and accordingly,
multi-employer plans will not be considered.
15. See infra notes 20-87 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 88-182 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 183-213 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 214-249 and accompanying text.
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may ultimately provide the best solution to ensure the long-term sur-
vival of the PBGC.t9
II. BACKGROUND
This section first reviews the context in which ERISA was enacted,
the problems this legislation was designed to alleviate, and the types
of pension plans it covers. 20 This section next provides an overview of
the methods by which pension plans can terminate under ERISA.21
Finally, this section examines the importance of reforming ERISA to
ensure the survival of pension plans and to protect workers.22
A. Overview of ERISA and the PBGC
In the 1960s and 1970s, several major companies collapsed and ter-
minated their pension plans.23 Because there were no laws requiring
companies to fund their pension plans, many pension plans were se-
verely underfunded. 24 Therefore, when a company collapsed, there
was often not enough money in the pension plans to cover the bene-
19. See infra Part V.
20. See infra notes 23-51 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 66-87 and accompanying text.
23. Studebaker Packard was one of the most well-known companies that terminated its pen-
sion plan during this time period. Other companies eliminating benefits included the Kaiser-
Frazer Corporation (Kaiser) and the American Motors Corporation. James A. Wooton, The
Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business: The Studebaker Packard Corporation and the
Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 695-97 (2001). The Kaiser Corporation provides an
example of how in the pre-ERISA period a company not undergoing bankruptcy could default
on pension plans for its own financial benefit. Kaiser, with a few long-term employees, closed its
plant, and forced its employees to forfeit whatever benefit accruals they had. Id. But, Kaiser
continued the plan for a small number of employees who worked at other smaller plants. Id. As
a result, Kaiser's plan had more funding than was necessary for the amount of employees the
plan supported. Id. at 696. The former employees sued to force Kaiser to terminate the plan
and distribute its funds, but were ultimately unsuccessful. Id.
24. In the 1870's, American Express was the first private company to sponsor a pension plan
for its employees. Wolfe, supra note 3, at 146 (citing Michael Tackett, Pensions Began as Re-
ward, Remain Employer's Option, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 3, 1989, at 25). However, because union
leaders resisted pension plans as a "departure from traditional union goals," the growth of these
plans was slow. J. Robert Suffoletta Jr., Who Should Pay When Federally Insured Pension Funds
Go Broke? A Strategy for Recovering from the Wrongdoers, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 308, 311
(1990) (citing 100 CONG. REC. 10,318-19 (1954)). For example, "[b]y 1930, a mere 2.7 million
active workers-only fifteen percent of all privately employed nonfarm workers-were covered
by private pension plans with reserves of $800 million." Id. at 311-12 (citing AMERICAN COUN-
CIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, 1981 PENSION FACTS 33 (1981)). Private pension plans became more
popular in the 1950s. Id. The Revenue Act of 1942 provided deductions for contributions of
these plans, and because of the high tax rates in the 1950s, these plans became more attractive to
employers. Id. (citing Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 753, § 165, 56 Stat. 798, 862-67). "[B]y
1960, private pension plans covered 20.5 million persons." Id. However, there was little federal
oversight over these programs which led to substantial underfunding in some cases. It was not
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fits. 25 A well-known example of pension underfunding was the bank-
ruptcy of Studebaker in 1963:26
When Studebaker-Packard closed the facility in December 1963 the
pension plan for hourly workers did not have enough assets to meet
its obligations. Retirees and retirement-eligible employees aged
sixty and older received their full pension, but the plan defaulted on
its obligations to younger employees. Some received a lump-sum
payment worth a fraction of the pension they expected, and others
got nothing at all.27
Against this backdrop, Congress enacted ERISA to accomplish
three distinct goals: "[T]o encourage the growth of defined benefit
pension plans, to provide timely and uninterrupted payment of pen-
sion benefits, and to keep pension insurance premiums at a mini-
until 1962 that United Auto Worker Union officials began seriously advocating "public reinsur-
ance for private pension plans." Wooton, supra note 23, at 724.
25. Jerry Geisel, Liabilities threatening long-term future of PBGC; Benefit experts say time is
now to reform pension plan funding rules, Bus. INS., Aug. 30, 2004, at T12, available at 2004
WLNR 1759460.
26. The Studebaker company originally began as a wagon company in the 1800s and began
manufacturing automobiles in 1902. A Very Brief History of the Studebaker Family and Com-
pany, Studebaker Family, at www.studebakerfamily.org/history.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
Due in large part to the army vehicles and ambulances Studebaker provided to the U.S. govern-
ment in World War I, Studebaker developed a reputation as a producer of reliable automobiles
until the 1930s. Id. In the 1930s, however, Studebaker encountered serious financial problems,
which were only temporarily resolved by World War II. Id. After the war, Studebaker never
totally regained its pre-WWII position. Id. In particular, Studebaker was very negatively im-
pacted by a poorly-received car it produced in 1953, called the Centennial. Id. In 1957, the
company merged with Packard in hopes of raising its rapidly slumping sales but Studebaker's
problems proved to be too severe, and in 1963, it shut its doors. Id. Because of this shutdown,
approximately four thousand workers lost most of their pension benefits. Douglas J. Elliot,
PBGC: A Primer, Center for Federal Financial Institutions (Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://
www.coffi.org/pubs/PBGC%20A%20Primer.pdf.
27. Wooton, supra note 23, at 683-84. Ultimately, when Studebaker announced in 1968 that it
would close its plant in South Bend, Indiana, "the liability of [its] pension plan exceeded its
assets by $15 million." Id. at 726. The Congressional findings in ERISA state:
[T]hat the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their
dependants are directly affected by these plans; .. .that [the benefit plans] have be-
come an important factor affecting the stability of employment and the successful de-
velopment of industrial relations; ... and that it is therefore desirable in the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the United
States, and to provide for the free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be pro-
vided assuring the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000). Thus, ERISA requires the disclosure and reporting to participants
and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing stan-
dards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by
providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the federal courts. Id.
§ 1001(b). ERISA also seeks to improve the equitable character and the soundness of such
plans by requiring them to: (1) vest the accrued benefits of employees with significant periods of
service; (2) meet minimum standards of funding; and (3) obtain plan termination insurance. Id.
§ 1001(c). See also Reece, supra note 2, at 152.
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mum."'28 These three goals aimed at adding a missing but necessary
element of security to pension plans without overburdening the em-
ployer. On Labor Day in 1974, President Gerald Ford signed ERISA
into law.2 9
Title IV of ERISA created the PBGC, an agency designed to ad-
minister an insurance program protecting workers' and retirees' pen-
sion benefits should their employers terminate their pension plans.30
ERISA does not require that employers contribute all funds necessary
to pay all future pensions up front but instead sets contribution
amounts according to a complex formula.31 Therefore, if the plan ter-
minates for any reason, the PBGC guarantees it will pay the owed
pensions but only up to a certain amount. 32 The maximum pension
benefit guaranteed by the PBGC for plans ending in 2004 is $44,386.32
per year.33 According to the Center on Federal Financial Institutions
(COFFI), 34 "forty-four million employees and retirees in more than
31,000 private defined benefit pension plans rely on the PBGC to pro-
tect $1.5 trillion worth of promised pension payments. '35
The PBGC has three main sources of funding. First, the PBGC re-
ceives insurance premiums paid by employers who have defined bene-
fit plans under ERISA. 36 All employers currently must pay nineteen
28. Len Boselovic, US Airways tries to shift pension bill of $2 Billion, PiTTSBURGH POST-GA-
ZETITE, Sept. 15, 2004, at Al, available at 2004 WLNR 18097001. It should be noted that "[a]
pension pays income either upon retirement or at some time following termination of employ-
ment." Korobkin, supra note 5, at 8.
29. Wooton, supra note 23, at 739.
30. Hannah B. Wildus, Plan Termination Insurance: An Overview of Title IV of ERISA, 302
PRAcrISING LAW INSTITUTE, TAX 759, 761 (1990). The PBGC has "broad corporate and govern-
mental powers," including the right to file lawsuits in its own name and issue rules and regula-
tions. William G. Beyer, Government Entities in Your Bankruptcy Case: Why Are They There
and What Do They Want?, Address at the Eleventh Annual Southwest Bankruptcy Conference
(Sept. 18-21, 2003), available at www.westlaw.com. The PBGC is administered by the Secretar-
ies of Labor, Treasury, and Commerce and is chaired by the Secretary of Labor. Id.
31. Section 302 of ERISA determines minimum funding contributions for defined benefit
plans. However, some experts contend that underfunding issues do not arise from the statutory
funding requirements, but rather from other factors. See PBGC: A Primer, supra note 26, at 27.
The author noted: "[U]nderfunding results from: inadequate investment returns; employer flexi-
bility on timing of contributions; retroactive benefit increases; and misestimates of lifespans and
retirement dates." Id. at 2.
32. Id.
33. Boselovic, supra note 28.
34. COFFI is an independent, nonprofit institute that studies federal insurance activities See
Coffi, at www.coffi.org.
35. Id.
36. Boselovic, supra note 28. See also infra notes 97-129 and accompanying text (discussing
arguments for and against raising insurance premiums). As explained by the PBGC,
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) protects the retirement benefits
of 44.4 million workers and retirees without the use of tax dollars from the general
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dollars per year per participant, although companies posing high risks
of underfunding must pay an additional nine dollars per participant. 37
Some advocates of ERISA reform, including President George W.
Bush, recommend raising premiums as one possible solution to the
ERISA crisis.38 A second source of funding is the money the PBGC
earns on the returns from its investments of the premiums. 3
9
Finally, the PBGC receives funds from employer liability payments
it collects when employers terminate their plans and cannot pay owed
benefits.40 If the employer files for bankruptcy and terminates the
plan, the PBGC may collect funds as an unsecured creditor.4' In a
bankruptcy, creditors are ranked according to their statutorily deter-
mined priority status, and lower ranked creditors cannot be paid until
the debts of higher ranked creditors are satisfied.42 Often, the PBGC
is not able to collect the full amount owed after other higher priority
creditors are paid.43 Many experts contend that the purpose of ER-
ISA and its language suggest that the PBGC should be granted higher
priority status.44
The PBGC insures defined benefit plans.45 Defined benefit plans
are plans in which an employer determines the benefits it will pay its
fund. PBGC's revenue is derived from insurance premiums paid by 31,200 insured pen-
sion plans, investment income, and recoveries from employers responsible for termi-
nated underfunded defined benefit plans. Premium revenue totaled about $1.5 billion
in 2004.
PBGC, Pension Insurance Premiums, at http://www.pbgc.gov/medialkey-resources-for-the-press/
content/pagel3541.html (last edited Jan. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Premiums].
37. Id.
38. Danielle DiMartino, Pension Plan Looks Doomed, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 20,
2005, at 4D. President Bush specifically advocates raising the premiums to thirty dollars per
participant. Id.
39. Boselovic, supra note 28.
40. Id. As one commentator has noted:
When a plan terminates with insufficient assets, the PBGC may pursue the plan
sponsor for both unfunded benefits and for a plan's accumulated funding deficiency.
Since the PBGC's potential unrecouped liability increases the longer a plan's funding
deficiency continues, the agency must make a judgment regarding when to terminate an
unfunded plan.
Daniels, supra note 3, at 43.
41. Jill Uylaki, Promises Made, Promises Broken: Securing Defined Benefit Plan Incomes in
the Wake of Employer Bankruptcy: Should We Rethink Priority Status for the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation?, 6 ELDER L.J. 77, 93 (1998). See infra notes 133-182 and accompanying
text.
42. Uylaki, supra note 41, at 92 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 506-07 (1994)); see also infra notes
134-136 and accompanying text.
43. Uylaki, supra note 41, at 92; see also infra note 137 and accompanying text.
44. Uylaki, supra note 41, at 93; see also infra note 133 and accompanying text.
45. Wildus, supra note 30, at 762.
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employees and contributes the necessary amount to a pension fund.46
In many cases, the amount of retirement income an employee will re-
ceive depends on how long the employee worked for the company. 47
In addition, the employer must pay insurance premiums to the PBGC
in case the employer later terminates its plan and the PBGC assumes
responsibility. 48 ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) deter-
mine the amount of the required minimum premiums. 4 9 Not all plans
are defined benefit plans. Instead, many employers have defined con-
tribution plans. In these plans, "the plan sponsor contributes a certain
amount for each participant, but no promise is made as to the ultimate
benefit or amount that will be received." 50 Defined contribution
plans, such as 401(k) plans, are not guaranteed by the PBGC.51
46. Daniels, supra note 3, at 33.
47. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 20. A defined benefit plan may calculate owed benefits by two
methods. It may simply provide the retiree a specific dollar amount. Frequently Asked Ques-
tions about Pension Plans and ERISA, Department of Labor, at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/FAQs/
faqscompliance-pension.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2005). More often however, the plan "may
calculate a benefit through a plan formula that considers such factors as salary and service-for
example, 1 percent of average salary for the last five years of employment for every year of
service with an employer." Id.
48. Elliot, supra note 26, at 4.
49. Daniels, supra note 3, at 33 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (1994)).
50. Id. Advantages of a defined benefit plan compared to a defined contribution plan are: (1)
defined benefit plans are useful to the "unsophisticated investor" employee because the more
sophisticated employer bears the investment risk; and (2) defined benefit plans offer more secur-
ity to a retiree, because defined contribution plans give retirees lump sum payments, which are
often spent in the employee's first retirement years. Michael J. Collins, Reviving Defined Benefit
Plans: Analysis and Suggestions for Reform, 20 VA. TAX REV. 599, 600-01 (2001). In contrast,
defined contribution plans are often preferred by employers because they have much lower ad-
ministrative costs. Id. at 601. "A 1998 study estimated that the cumulative effect of the changes
in the regulatory environment increased the cost of maintaining a defined benefit plan from
about 140 percent of the cost of maintaining a defined contribution plan in 1981, to more than
210 percent in 1996." Id. A disadvantage of defined contribution plans "is that the employee
bear the risk of return on the investment because there is not a guaranteed level of benefits
promised to the employee." Kathleen H. Czarney, The Future of Americans' Pensions: Revamp-
ing Pension Plan Asset Allocation to Combat the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's Deficit,
51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 153, 169 (2004) (citing David A. Pratt, Nor Rhyme Nor Reason: Simplifying
Defined Contribution Plans, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 741, 761, 759 (2001)). Employees covered under
this type of plan receive the amount of the plan's assets, "regardless of whether the plan exper-
ienced gains or losses." Id.
51. Scott L. Hazan et al., Airlines: Nosediving into Dangerous Pension Territory, 859 PRACtis-
ING LAW INSTITUTE, COMMERCIAL L. & PRACTICE 499, 501 (2004). Employer-based pension
plans can further be divided into single-employer plans and multi-employer plans. Robin E.
Phelan, Employer/Employee Problems in Bankruptcy Cases, 649 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE,
COMM. 43, 54 (1993). Multi-employer plans are created by the collective bargaining efforts of
labor unions and cover employees of different companies. Michael J. Cohen, Questioning How
the Bankruptcy Priority Scheme Treats Tax Claims Arising From the Termination of Overfunded
Pension Plans, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2443 (2002). As required by § 302(c)(5) of the Taft-
Hartley Act, the union and employers jointly administer the plan. Id. at 2444 (citing Richard S.
Soble et al., Pension-Related Claims in Bankruptcy, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 155, 158 (1982)). Ap-
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B. Termination of Defined Benefit Pension Plans
Under ERISA, there are several ways in which pensions may termi-
nate. 52 First, an employer can voluntarily move to terminate its plan
in a standard termination. 53 In this scenario, the plan must have
enough money to pay all benefits before the plan can end, and em-
ployers will be liable to the PBGC for one hundred percent of the
plan benefit liabilities. 54 Second, an employer can voluntarily act to
terminate its plan in a distress termination. 55 Here, the employer
must prove it will face financial difficulty if forced to continue the
plan.56 The PBGC will assume responsibility for guaranteed benefits
while making efforts to collect funds from the employer. 57 Third, the
PBGC can move to terminate a company's pension plan if the com-
pany has not met minimum funding requirements and the PBGC will
face an unreasonable risk in the long run if the plan continues. 58
Typically, when an employer is facing Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the
employer is required to balance many competing interests. These in-
terests arise because the company is planning to reorganize and is
hoping to emerge from bankruptcy and continue to function after the
proximately one-fifth of employees covered by defined benefit plans participate in multi-em-
ployer plans. Single- and Multi- Employer Defined Benefit Plans Differ, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, at www.bls.gov/opub/ted/1999/Apr/wkl/artO3.htm (Apr. 7,
1999). Single-employer plans encompass all other plans. In this situation, a single employer
establishes a plan for all employees, and the employer alone is responsible for the support and
management of the plan. Cohen, supra note 51, at 2444. The scope of this Comment will include
only single-employer plans, such as the plan sponsored by United.
52. Author Mark Daniels noted:
Section 4021 of ERISA addresses which plans are within ERISA's termination
scheme ... a plan must: (1) be a defined benefit plan; (2) which is established or main-
tained by an employer or labor organization or both, in any industry or activity affect-
ing commerce; and (3) which has operated as a tax-qualified plan for the past five years
or has been determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be a tax-qualified plan
under the IRC.
Daniels, supra note 3, at 48.
53. Gary M. Ford & Michael J. Prame, Bankruptcy and Defined Benefit Pension Plans, AMER-
ICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION 639, 641
(2003).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. Daniels stated:
[Tihe PBGC must determine whether a plan qualifies for distress termination under
any of the three possible criteria. The three possible situations which will support a
distress termination are: (a) liquidation in bankruptcy; (b) a reorganization in bank-
ruptcy in which the court determines that a termination is necessary to facilitate said
reorganization; and (c) a non-bankruptcy situation where termination is necessary.
Daniels, supra note 3, at 54.
57. Boselovic, supra note 28.
58. Hazan et al., supra note 51, at 501.
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bankruptcy. Thus, the employer must first weigh its promises to its
employees against its own capacity to meet those needs.59 Employers
make many different promises to its employees-"commitments...
for wages, for benefits, and even future employment. ' 60 Unfortu-
nately, when the business encounters turmoil, it may become a chal-
lenge to meet these promises, and "the business may have to close
plants, lay off employees, or reduce certain wages or benefits. '61
In the event that an employer terminates its pension plan during
bankruptcy, formal obligations imposed by legislation may further
complicate these conflicting interests. On one hand, ERISA is geared
toward ensuring that the employer meets its obligations to its employ-
ees.62 For example, "[u]nder ERISA, if a pension plan is terminated,
the employer is required to ensure payment of all benefits earned to
the date of termination. If the employer is in bankruptcy, this obliga-
tion may be reduced, but plan participants are guaranteed a minimum
amount of benefits. ' 63 Thus, the PBGC may make a claim on the
assets of a company in bankruptcy.64 A reorganizing company, how-
ever, has other parties whose interests it must consider. "A reorganiz-
ing company must reach an accommodation with its creditors to
continue in operation and pay at least a portion of its obligations. ' 65
C. The Necessity of ERISA Reform
Experts assert three primary reasons why ERISA must be reformed
to ensure the survival of the PBGC so that employees' retirement
benefits are protected.66 First, employees typically cannot protect
59. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 11.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Daniels, supra note 3, at 32.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. For the purposes of this Comment, the author is assuming that the ultimate goal of ERISA
reform is to ensure the survival of the PBGC and defined benefit plans. This Comment does not
argue that defined benefit plans should be replaced with defined contribution plans, or that
employer-based pension plans should be eradicated. Employer-based pension plans are impor-
tant for several reasons. Although they work in tandem with Social Security and individual
retirement plans like Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), these other retirement plans only
provide a fraction of the benefits that employer-based plans offer. Daniel Halperin, Employer-
Based Retirement Income-the Ideal, the Possible, and the Reality, 11 ELDER L.J. 37, 40 (2003).
For example, the highest benefit offered by Social Security is currently approximately $20,000
per year. Id. (citing Benefit Examples for Workers with Maximum Earnings, Social Security Ad-
ministration, at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/examp (Oct. 12, 2002)). Thus, "it is unlikely
that Social Security benefits will achieve full income replacement." Id. Private savings, such as
IRAs, are also often insufficient because many workers fail to take advantage of these plans. Id.
"[O]nly a small minority of households earning less than $25,000 have taken advantage of the
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themselves and their interests before a company terminates its plans.67
As one commentator has noted, "Generally, employees are unable to
assess the present and future creditworthiness of their employer, and
it is often difficult for them to monitor their employer's financial con-
dition during the course of their employment. ' 68 Furthermore, em-
ployees' ability to take action may be limited.69 "Even if they happen
to learn of an employer's financial troubles in time to act, workers
may lack the mobility to change jobs. '70 Therefore, it is important
that a neutral third party, like a government agency, promulgates reg-
ulations that protect employees from being left without pension bene-
fits when employers encounter financial difficulty.71
Second, and perhaps more importantly, because the PBGC is facing
severe financial problems due to the collapse of many industries and
the subsequent need to rescue the plans of many steel companies and
airlines,72 many experts argue that it is essential that ERISA is re-
formed so taxpayers do not shoulder the burden of paying the owed
pensions.73 The magnitude of the PBGC's problems have not gone
unrecognized. In July 2003, the Government Accountability Office
opportunity to establish an IRA. Id. (citing Daniel I. Halperin & Alicia H. Munnell, How the
Pension System Should Be Reformed, Address at the Brookings Institute Conference at the
National Press Club 54 (Sept. 17, 1999), available at http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/es/eventsl
erisa/99papers/erisalO.pdf). For these reasons, employer-based plans play a vital role in many
workers' retirement plans. Id.
67. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 6. Different employers may offer several different types of
defined benefit plans to its employees. For example, United has four plans. It maintains the
United Airlines Management, Administrative, and Public Contact Pension Plan for administra-
tive employees and the United Airlines Ground Retirement Plan for ground employees. Key
Facts on United Airline's Pension Plans, International Association of Machinist and Aerospace
Workers, at http://www.iamaw.org/publications/pdfs/keyfacts-on-united-pension%20plans.pdf
(last visited Feb. 23, 2005). United's pilots are covered under the United Airlines Pilot Defined
Benefit Pension Plan. PBGC, PBGC to Assume Responsibility for Pilots Pension Plan at UAL,
at http://www.pbgc.gov/news/press-releases/2004/prO5-18.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005). Fi-
nally, United has the United Airlines Mechanic and Ramp, Stores, Food Service, and Related
Employee Pension Plan for other mechanics and food service employees, and several others.
Brief for UAL Corp. at 2, UAL v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, No. 02-B-48191 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2004) (No. 04-3186) (on file with the DePaul Law Review).
68. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 6.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Since the PBGC's "creation, the airline and steel industries have accounted for more than
70 percent of all claims while representing less than 5 percent of all insured participants." Jeff St.
Onge, Pension Crisis Looming, Taxpayers May Get Stuck with Tab, Study Warns, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Aug. 25, 2004, at C3, available at www.lexisnexis.com.
73. See The Impact of Federal Pensions and Bankruptcy Policy on the Financial Health of the
Airline Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 108th Cong.
(2004) (statement of Bradley Belt, Executive Director, PBGC) [hereinafter Belt statement],
available at www.lexisnexis.com.
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(GAO) "placed the PBGC single-employer pension program on [its]
'high risk' list of troubled federal programs. '74 At the end of 2003, the
PBGC held thirty-five billion dollars in assets but had a deficit of
$11.2 billion.75 The PBGC's current deficit is more than nine billion.76
United's pension plans cover 58,000 current retirees-a number
which does not include future retirees. 77  Since United's four plans
were terminated, more than five billion in pension liabilities have
fallen on the PBGC.78 While the PBGC is in "no immediate danger
of running out of money,"' 79 United's underfunding of its pension
plans, if considered together with underfunded pension plans
at other airlines, may threaten the survival of the PBGC.80 The
74. Walker statement, supra note 13. The GAO is the Government Accountability Office,
which was formerly known as the General Accounting Office. David M. Walker, GAO Answers
the Question: What's in a Name?, ROLL CALL, July 18, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.gao.gov.
about/rollcal107192004.pdf. The GAO changed its name because its former name "had not kept
pace with GAO's evolving role in government." Id. The GAO "examines the use of public
funds ... and provides analyses, options, and other assistance to help the Congress make effec-
tive oversight, policy, and funding decisions." GAO Strategic Plan 2004-2009, GAO, at http://
www.gao.gov/atext/d04534sp.txt (Mar. 1, 2004). As part of its duties, the GAO publishes a list at
the start of each Congressional Session naming federal agencies engaged in questionable ac-
counting practices, the purpose of which is "to provide helpful information to Congress about
management of government agencies and departments." Kelly Patricia 0 Meara, High-Risk Fi-
nance at the Federal Level, Civic Actions, at http://www.civicactions.com/article.php?story=2004
0110145342708 (Aug. 21, 2003). In its analysis, the GAO weighs factors such as "economic im-
pact, service delivery, or program failure." Tools for Success: Government Oversight, The White
House, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/results/tools/gaofaq4.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
75. Danielle DiMartino, Who Will Pay for Pensions?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 26, 2004,
at 6D. Belt called the $11.2 billion deficit reported in 2003 a "record deficit." Belt statement,
supra note 73.
76. Geisel, supra note 25.
77. Griffin, supra note 4.
78. Id. Like United, US Airways is also trying to terminate its pension plans, thus potentially
contributing to the disaster facing the PBGC. Danielle DiMartino, Pension dominoes lining up,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 15, 2004, at 4D. On September 14, 2004, US Airways, also in
bankruptcy, announced that it may terminate two of its pension plans. Id. The next day US
Airways failed to make a $110 pension payment that was due. Boselovic, supra note 28.
"Among US Airways' baggage as it heads into its second bankruptcy is an estimated $2 billion
pension liability that the airline hopes to shift to the PBGC." Id.
79. Geisel, supra note 25.
80. The "PBGC said it will guarantee basic pension benefits to employees and retirees at
United Airlines and US Airways if their plans are dissolved, but it said the potential termina-
tions point to a need for legal reforms." David Kesmodel, Pension Pledge Made: Insurer Says
Airline Employees, Retirees to Get Basic Benefits, DENV. ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 15, 2004, at
B2, available at 2004 WLNR 1234398. United and US Airways are not the only airlines currently
on the financial edge. Delta Air Lines and Northwest Airlines recently filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy. Susan Carey & Evan Perez, Delta, Northwest Seek Relief for Pension Plans, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 16, 2005, at A3.
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total underfunding of airline plans amounts to thirty-one billion
dollars.81
Some experts predict that "[w]ithout changes to its funding and pre-
mium rules, the PBGC's deficit is likely to swell to $18 billion in the
next 10 years and may reach more than $50 billion. '82 Consequently,
should the PBGC's deficit become overwhelming, the nation's taxpay-
ers may be forced to rescue the agency in order to ensure that pen-
sioners can continue to receive their benefits.8 3 Bradley Belt, the
Executive Director of the PBGC, said that "[W]hen underfunded pen-
sion plans terminate, three groups can lose: workers face the prospect
of benefit reductions; other companies, including those that are
healthy and have well funded plans, may face higher PBGC premi-
ums; and, ultimately, taxpayers may be called upon by Congress to
bail out the pension insurance fund .... -84 The PBGC announced
that it will guarantee the pensions owed to employees of United and
US Airways, but to continue successfully protecting employee pen-
sions, the PBGC argues that Congress must pass certain reforms pro-
viding the PBGC adequate funding from the companies it insures. 85
Third, given the history of the PBGC and pension crises that oc-
curred in the 1990s, it has become clear that a dramatic change in
legislation is necessary. 86 That is, these issues have arisen before, and
81. Geisel, supra note 25. It should be noted that this figure is based on circa 1980 mortality
tables, and some actuaries estimated it would increase it by "$7 billion by 2006 if the tables were
updated." DiMartino, supra note 78.
82. St. Onge, supra note 72. The Cato Institute, a Washington-based policy research group,
published a study reporting that "a $350 billion pension shortfall among US companies may
force the federal agency that insures retirement plans to seek a taxpayer bailout similar to the
one required during the savings-and-loan crisis." Id. Richard A. Ippolito, the former PBGC
chief economist, is the author of the Cato study. Id.
83. Mary Walsh Williams, An Outsider's Grim Prognosis for Pension Agency, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 2004, at C1.
84. The Effect of Federal Bankruptcy and Pension Policy on the Financial Situation of the Air-
lines: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 108th Cong. (2004) (testi-
mony of Bradley D. Belt, Executive Director, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation)
[hereinafter Belt testimony], available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfmid=
1332&wit id=3891. There are those who argue a taxpayer bailout may be a real possibility:
This situation is analogous in some ways to the Savings and Loan crisis. The insur-
ance fund for the Savings and Loan didn't have any claim on the federal government
either. However, it's impossible for me to believe that the politicians will let the checks
to gramma and grampa just stop-just as it was impossible for the politicians to let
people lose money on their deposits in the savings and loans.
Who Will Rescue the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.?, BCD NEWS AND COMMENT, October, 5,
2004, available at www.lexisnexis.com [hereinafter Who Will Rescue the PBGC?].
85. Pension Protections, supra note 13.
86. Both the metal and airline industries have faced increasing numbers of crises in the 1990s.
PBGC, Pension Insurance and the American Workforce, at http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/fact
shts/INDUSTRY.htm (edited Apr. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Pension Insurance]. By 1998, the PBGC
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unless a change is made, they will happen again. As David Walker,
Comptroller General of the United States has stated:
First, this is not the first time we have witnessed the simultaneous
struggles of the airline industry and airline pension underfunding
.... Since [the 1980s] we've seen PBGC take over a number of
badly underfunded plans including Pan American, Eastern, Braniff,
and TWA .... Second, the airlines' experience illustrates the speed
with which a pension funding crisis can develop. In 2001, PBGC
reported that as a whole the air transportation industry had more
than enough assets to cover the liabilities in its pension plans. Yet
just 3 years later the industry threatens to saddle PBGC with its
biggest losses ever from plan terminations. [Third,] serious pension
underfunding is not confined to the airline industry. Of the 10 most
underfunded pension plan terminations in PBGC's history, 5 have
been in the steel industry .... Looking ahead, in addition to air-
lines, automotive related firms may present the greatest ongoing
risk to PBGC, with over $60 billion in underfunding as of 2003.87
The history of defined benefit pension plans has made it clear that
reform is necessary in order to permanently solve the dramatic issues
facing the PBGC.
III. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED REFORMS
Based on the two ways in which the PBGC collects funding from
the companies it insures, there are two major reforms being advocated
to save the PBGC from financial ruin. First, some experts urge an
increase in the variable-rate premiums that some employers are re-
quired to pay to the PBGC.8 8 Many assert that the premium rate
structure should more accurately reflect the risk that a financially un-
stable company with an underfunded plan poses to the PBGC.89 Sec-
ond, there are many who argue that to collect funding to support the
pension plans the PBGC is assuming, the PBGC should be able to
paid pension benefits to 58,400 retirees of plans sponsored by the metal industries and was obli-
gated to an additional 24,700 future retirees. Id. These numbers represent employees of 423
underfunded pension plans of which the PBGC assumed responsibility owing to the bankrupt-
cies of metal companies such as McLouth Steel, CF & I Steel, LTV Steel Company, and Sharon
Steel. Id. Pensions paid to steel industry workers "represent[ ] 40% of the dollar value of all
claims on the PBGC's insurance fund to date." Id. The airline industry was also devastated in
the early 1990s, causing the PBGC to assume the pension benefits of 42,900 airline retirees and
become obligated to pay pensions to 34,100 future airline retirees. Id. Major airline bankrupt-
cies included Pan American World Airways and Eastern Airlines. Id. These airlines, among
several others, had funding shortfalls of $1.4 billion, which the PBGC was forced to assume.
Pension Insurance, supra note 86. "Airlines account for 24% of the total dollar value of all
claims on the PBGC's insurance fund." Id.
87. Walker statement, supra note 13.
88. Who Will Rescue the PBGC?, supra note 84.
89. Belt testimony, supra note 84.
AIRLINES IN DISTRESS
place an effective lien upon a company's assets when the company is in
bankruptcy. 90 To achieve this, the PBGC's status in a Chapter 11
bankruptcy would have to be elevated above that of a general un-
secured creditor. 91 Some experts contend that the PBGC should have
administrative or tax priority status.92 In order to demonstrate that
raising the PBGC's status in bankruptcy is the better solution, this
section will propose components of an "ideal" solution and apply both
proposed reforms to the ideal solution.
A. Premiums
Although the premium structure has undergone much change since
the enactment of ERISA thirty years ago, there are many who would
argue that the PBGC's deficit demonstrates that further reform of the
premium structure is necessary. 93 This section first examines the
evolution of the premium structure and its inadequacies. 94 This sec-
tion next examines the advantages and disadvantages of raising premi-
ums, particularly focusing between the balance of ensuring the
PBGC's ability to cover terminated pension plans while not discourag-
ing companies from offering defined benefit plans because of higher
costs.95 Finally, this section argues that the best way to adjust the pre-
mium structure would be to modify the variable-rate premium to re-
flect the financial risk the employer poses to the PBGC.96
1. The Premium Structure Does Not Adequately Allow the PBGC
to Pay Projected Pension Benefits
The current premium structure is flawed because it does not allow
the PBGC to pay the pension benefits experts are projecting the
PBGC will owe in light of United's and US Airways's bankruptcies
and the other large pension plans the PBGC assumed control of in the
1990s. 97 Ideally, the premium structure should allow the PBGC to
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Hazan et al., supra note 51, at 501.
93. For example, raising premiums is one solution being advocated by Douglas Holtz-Eakin,
Director of the Congressional Budget Office. Solvency of Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion: Current Financial Condition and Potential Risks: Hearing Before the S. Budget Comm.,
109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Congressional Budget Office).
94. See infra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 108-126 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Belt statement, supra note 73.
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meet its revenue needs and "appropriately reflect the risks that it
covers."
98
The premium structure has been modified several times since ER-
ISA's enactment in 1974. Originally, the single-employer premium
was a flat rate of one dollar per participant.99 There were several in-
creases in the premium rates over the years, but the most significant
adjustments occurred in 1988.100 That year there was an increase in
the basic premium rate, and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1987 introduced a variable-rate premium, which would be imposed
on plans that were significantly underfunded.' 0 '
The PBGC is not collecting enough from its premium structure to
cover its costs. In 2003, all single-employer pension plans paid a basic
"flat-rate premium of $19 per participant per year," and
"[u]nderfunded plans were required to pay an additional variable-rate
charge of $9 per $1,000 of unfunded vested benefits. 102 Thus, the
PBGC collected $973 million of insurance premiums in 2003, seventy
percent of which came from the basic flat-rate payments and thirty
percent of which came from the variable-rate premium charged to un-
derfunded employers. 10 3 As of 2003, the PBGC insured pensions with
an estimated value of $1.5 trillion but only had thirty-five billion dol-
lars in assets. 104 Although it is true that the PBGC also collects funds
from companies in bankruptcy, it is clear that the pension premiums
will not enable the PBGC to meet its obligations. 10 5
The inadequacies of the premium structure are well-illustrated by a
close examination of United's situation. The PBGC reports that
United, which maintains a $6.4 billion pension benefit plan, only con-
tributed fifty million dollars in premiums. 10 6 Belt has noted that
98. Id. Belt testified: "Currently, PBGC's premium income is inadequate to cover projected
claims, and the premium structure provides minimal incentives for plans to remain funded." Id.
99. Premiums, supra note 36. This low amount was set because "when Congress established
the PBGC, 'the program was not expected to be big or costly."' Suffoletta, supra note 24, at 313
(citing K. Utgoff, Executive Director of the PBGC, Remarks before the Employee Benefits
Conference Board (Mar. 16, 1987)).
100. Premiums, supra note 36. For example, Congress raised the premium to $2.60 in 1978
and again to $8.50 in 1986. Id.
101. Id. See ERISA § 4006(a)(3) (2000).
102. Premiums, supra note 36. See ERISA § 4006(a)(3). The "variable rate premium" is the
sum of the basic premium rate and a risk related amount equal to $9 for each $1,000 of unfunded
vested benefits. Id. A vested benefit is one that is owed to an employee who has undergone a
period of employment such that non-forfeitable right to benefits have accrued. Elliot, supra
note 26, at 11.
103. Id. at 24.
104. Id. at 4--6.
105. See Belt statement, supra note 73.
106. Boselovic, supra note 28.
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United only had to pay this relatively minor amount "even though its
credit rating has only been good enough for junk bonds and its pen-
sion have been underfunded by five billion dollars on a termination
basis for at least the past four years. ' 10 7 That is, for its plan to be fully
funded and cover all current and future pension benefits, United
would have to pay five billion dollars. Because United is terminating
its plan without paying this amount, and the fifty million dollars it has
paid in premiums to the PBGC is not nearly enough to cover its obli-
gations, the PBGC must assume United's share of the obligation.
2. Is Raising Premiums a Solution?
A major question remains: is raising premium payments-either by
requiring employers to pay the full amount or adjusting premium pay-
ments to reflect risk-a correct solution to the problems facing the
PBGC? 10 8 Even before discussing the best way to raise premiums, it
must be acknowledged that there are many arguments for and against
raising premiums at all.
a. Arguments for Raising Premiums
The PBGC is urging Congress to raise premiums because premiums
are one of the two ways that the PBGC receives the revenue it uses to
pay pensions when an employer terminates its plans.109 Increasing
premiums would better allow the PBGC to meet its obligations if
companies terminate their defined benefit plans.110 Increased premi-
ums are one very real way to close the increasing disparity between
the amount of benefits the PBGC pays out each year and the amount
the PBGC takes in each year.1"1
107. Denise Marois, PBGC Can Still Bank Airline Pensions, But Deficits Loom, AVIATION
DAILY, Oct. 14, 2004, at 4, available at www.proquest.com. Even more dramatic are the
problems at Kaiser Aluminum Corporation, which declared bankruptcy in October 2004.
The plan is 48 percent funded, with about $301 million in assets to cover $629 million in
liabilities. The PBGC has now taken on $555 million of Kaiser Aluminum's benefit
promises. Kaiser Aluminum has transferred to the PBGC, in addition to the hourly
pension plan, the liabilities of its pension plans for salaried and inactive workers. The
company has paid a total of about $19 million in premiums for the three plans since
1994, the PBGC said.
Albert B. Crenshaw, No Simple Solutions to Pension Problems, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2004, at
F4.
108. See Belt testimony, supra note 84; see also Walker statement, supra note 13.
109. Daniels, supra note 3, at 36.
110. See Walker statement, supra note 13.
111. The Impact of Federal Pensions and Bankruptcy Policy on the Financial Health of the
Airline Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 108th Cong.
(2004) (statement of Sen. John McCain, Chairman) [hereinafter McCain statement].
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Furthermore, if premiums were related to the funding level of the
pension plan or the financial soundness of a company, premiums
could be used to encourage companies to properly manage their pen-
sion plans.' 12 That is, companies may have an incentive to adequately
fund their pension plans if the consequence of underfunding is a
higher premium payment to the PBGC.11 3
Finally, raising premiums ensures that the PBGC would be able to
pay pension benefits if the company underwent bankruptcy, which
benefits employers and employees by adding stability to the pension
plan. Employees have a guarantee that their benefits will be provided
in case the employer encounters financial difficulty that prevents it
from paying the plan.114 Employers are able to pay lower wages be-
cause they can offer attractive pension packages.11 5 Having a federal
agency back the pension plans means that employees are more willing
to accept the lower wages because they can feel secure that they will
receive the promised pensions later.1 6
b. Arguments Against Raising Premiums
There are several general objections against raising premium pay-
ments. First, although raising premium payments would theoretically
increase the PBGC's revenue such that it would be better able to pay
terminated pension plans, some experts question whether having the
PBGC pay terminated pension plans is really an adequate solution. 1 7
In some cases, because the PBGC caps its annual payments to retirees
at $44,386, the PBGC may distribute only a fraction of the pension
owed to retirees by the employer.118 Thus, "PBGC premiums, at best,
112. Belt testimony, supra note 84. "PBGC premiums can also play a useful role in encourag-
ing sound plan funding and discouraging risky behavior." Id.
113. As Martin Slate, the former Director of the PBGC, stated: "The variable rate charge
gives companies with underfunded plans a greater financial incentive to properly fund their
plans." Retirement Protection Act of 1993: Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the Oversight Subcomm.
on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong. (1993) (statement of Martin Slate, Exec. Director, PBGC).
114. Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 65,
92.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 73.
117. Wolfe, supra note 3, at 177.
118. This result is further exacerbated by the PBGC's distinction between employees who
retire before or at age sixty-five. McCain statement, supra note 111. The PBGC is required to
reduce its payouts to employees who retire before age sixty-five. PBGC, Termination Fact Sheet,
available at http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/factshts/TERMFACT.HTM (last edited Jan. 26,
2005). Thus, these employees cannot be paid even $44,386 per year, the maximum amount guar-
anteed by the PGBC, even if the employees would have qualified for much more if paid by the
employer. See generally The Effect of the Federal Bankruptcy and Pension Policy on the Finan-
cial Situation of the Airlines: Hearing Before the S. Comm. of Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 108th
Cong. (2004) (statement of Captain Duane Woerth, President, Airline Pilots Association Inter-
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provide limited security that the government will provide an insuffi-
cient benefit payment."'119
Second, raising premiums may adversely affect solvent companies
with defined benefit plans who are playing by the rules and not relying
on the PBGC to bail them out. Some experts argue that the PBGC is
in financial trouble because it has been mismanaged in the past and
because of the problems it has run into with other companies that
terminated underfunded plans.120 For example, some experts have ac-
cused the PBGC of "shoddy enforcement" of pension plans, including
poorly monitoring plans, "failing to perfect potential liens," and being
tardy "in terminating underfunded plans.' 121 It would not only be un-
fair to place the burden on these solvent companies, but it would also
require the companies to dedicate their own limited resources to fix-
ing a problem that they did not create.' 22 Senator James M. Jeffords
of Vermont has thus argued: "If Congress increases premiums to solve
the PBGC's problems, they would send a message to companies that
are meeting their pension obligations that not only do they have to
pay for their own pension benefits, at some point they will pay for the
benefits of their competitors. '" 123
Finally, companies may actually decide not to offer defined benefit
plans if the premiums are too high. One commentator has predicted,
"If premiums are raised too much for employers with well-funded
plans, the attractiveness of offering defined benefit plans will de-
crease.' 124 New employers may decide not to establish defined bene-
fit plans, or current employers with defined benefit plans may
voluntarily terminate the defined benefit plan and instead offer a de-
national), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1332&witid=
1941. This discrepancy is a particular problem for airline pilots, who are required by the FAA to
retire by age 60. McCain statement, supra note 111. It should be noted that the pension pay-
ment cap is increased on an annual basis according to the "annual inflation adjustment in the
Social Security program." Elliot, supra note 26, at 12.
119. Wolfe, supra note 3, at 177. Wolfe argues that:
True security lies in requiring companies to fund their plans because qualified plan
assets are restricted for the exclusive benefit of plan participants. By placing a primary
emphasis on requiring companies to fund plans, PBGC premiums would provide secur-
ity to participants in the event of misappropriation of plan assets. Plan participants
would be comforted in knowing their pension promises had assets backing them.
Id.
120. Id.
121. Daniel Keating, Chapter 11's New Ten-Ton Monster: The PBGC and Bankruptcy, 77
MINN. L. REV. 803, 809-10 (1993).
122. Wolfe, supra note 3, at 177.
123. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Geisel, supra note 25 (quoting Michael Pikelny, a benefit consultant and corporate actu-
ary with Hartmarx Corporation, an apparel manufacturer located in Chicago).
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fined contribution plan.125 Although there are many reasons why an
employer may choose to provide employees with defined contribution
plans, it would not be in line with Congress's intent if employers who
could offer stable defined benefit plans decided not to do so because
the premiums were too high.126
3. A Possible Reform to the Premium Pension Structure May
Include Changes to the Variable-Rate Premium
One possible reform advocated by the PBGC and other experts, to
save the PBGC from bankruptcy, is to modify the variable-rate premi-
ums. 127 In particular, the criteria for determining whether a com-
pany's plan is so underfunded that the employer must pay the
premium rate could be reformed. Under the current formula, many
firms do not pay a variable-rate premium. If, however, a straightfor-
ward underfunding test were applied, more plans would be required
to pay the premium. 128 As one commentator notes,
[F]irms are not charged if they had reached the full funding limit on
contributions. (Because potentially very different liability assump-
tions are used for the two calculations, many firms have been un-
derfunded for variable rate premium purposes and yet subject to
the full funding limit, which would impose excise taxes on further
contributions.)129
Thus, the premium rules could be restructured to include employers
who are not currently identified as high-risks.
B. Raising the PBGC's Status in a Bankruptcy Proceeding
First, this section examines the PBGC's current status in a com-
pany's bankruptcy proceeding and explains why its status is too low. 130
125. Wolfe, supra note 3, at 155 (citing Celia Silverman, Pension Evolution in a Changing
Economy, EBRI SPECIAL REPORT/ISSUE BRIEF (Employee Benefit Research Institute, D.C.),
Sept. 1993, at 4-5). "If PBGC premiums increase or the benefits PBGC insures decrease to a
level where employers believe they are paying more in premiums than the value of the insur-
ance, employers may decide to terminate or not to establish the defined benefit plans." Id.
126. Moreover, Congress's intent in enacting ERISA was to add stability to pension plans.
Czarney, supra note 50, at 159. One could argue that reforming ERISA so that defined benefit
plans are disadvantageous to employers would be contrary to Congress's intent of increased
security because defined contribution plans are not insured by the PBGC. Id. at 169. Thus,
defined contribution are less secure than defined benefit plans because "in the event of a market
failure, employees will receive only the balances of their individual plans." Id.
127. Belt statement, supra note 73. Most experts who advocate reform of the premium struc-
ture, as well as the PBGC, suggest that the variable-rate premium be adjusted according to the
method described in this section. Id.
128. Elliot, supra note 26, at 24.
129. Id.
130. See infra notes 133-159 and accompanying text.
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Next, this section evaluates the arguments for and against raising its
priority status. 31 Finally, this section argues that if the PBGC's status
is elevated, the PBGC should have administrative priority.132
1. Low-Priority Status Is Problematic
Many experts argue that during bankruptcy, the PBGC should be
given a higher priority than that of an unsecured creditor.133 In accor-
dance with the Bankruptcy Code, there are two kinds of creditors in a
bankruptcy proceeding: secured creditors and unsecured creditors. 134
The difference between secured and unsecured claims lies in whether
the creditor has a right to claim the debtor's property, in addition to
monetary payment, in case of a bankruptcy. A secured creditor has a
claim on the debtor's property while an unsecured creditor only has
the right to monetary payment.135 When ranking claims, unsecured
claims fall below secured claims and are divided into nine different
priority ranks.136 The rank of a creditor's claim is very important be-
cause each higher ranked claim is entitled to payment in full before
any lower ranked claims are paid.137 Consequently, "[t]he priority or
lien position that the PBGC seeks for its claims in bankruptcy will
often make the difference between significant recoveries for the fed-
eral pension insurer or bare minimal return. ' 138 Because of its low
status, the PBGC recovers only about twelve percent of its claims
from bankrupt corporations.1 39
There are two kinds of liens the PBGC may assert against a com-
pany, both of which can hinder the PBGC's ability to recover funds as
a secured creditor. 140 The PBGC can assert a lien for unfunded bene-
131. See infra notes 160-176 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 177-182 and accompanying text.
133. Uylaki, supra note 41, at 93.
134. Id. at 92 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1994)).
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 506-07).
137. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 507).
138. Keating, supra note 121, at 825. In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the priority status deter-
mines how a creditor will be paid. Daniels, supra note 3, at 64. The priority status is important
in a slightly different way in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, where a company is reorganizing and
plans to emerge from bankruptcy. Id. High priority claims are still paid before low priority
claims, although high priority claims are not fully satisfied. Id. Also, low priority claims can be
negotiated with the debtor company so that the claim can be satisfied at least in part. Id. at
64-65.
139. See PBGC: A Primer, supra note 26, at 4.
140. The PBGC may also assert a lien for unpaid premiums, but this lien will not be discussed
in this Comment because of its relative unimportance to the problem addressed.
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fit liabilities, a claim for unpaid minimum contributions, or both. 41
Liens for unfunded benefit liabilities are for "the amount of the excess
of the present value of the plan's benefit liabilities over the fair mar-
ket value of its assets.' 1 42 The PBGC can only assert this lien after it
has made a demand on the plan sponsor, and the agency is limited in
asserting this lien because the lien amount cannot exceed thirty per-
cent of the aggregate net worth of the employer's control group.1
43
The PBGC can also assert a lien for the amount of the employer's
required minimum funding contributions. 144 If an employer has filed
Chapter 11 bankruptcy and has not terminated its defined benefit
plan, the employer still must meet its minimum contribution pay-
ments. 145 If the PBGC has made a demand on the company, it can
assert a lien for this amount in the same manner that it can assert a
lien for unfunded benefit liabilities. 146 The PBGC can also automati-
cally assert a lien for minimum contribution payments against the plan
sponsor if the missed contributions exceed one million dollars in the
aggregate.14
7
Thus, the problem is not that the PBGC cannot assert liens, but that
the liens are often ineffective because of the way the Bankruptcy
Code limits the liens available to the PBGC.148 For the PBGC to be
classified as a secured creditor, the employer must terminate the plan
prior to filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and the PBGC must perfect
its lien against the company before it files for bankruptcy. 149 If these
two events do not occur before the employer files for bankruptcy, the
Bankruptcy Code prevents the PBGC from having secured creditor
status. Consequently, the Code's "automatic stay" provision frus-
trates the PBGC's claim. Section 362(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code
141. Robert J. Lowe et al., Employee Benefit Plans in Corporate Acquisitions, Dispositions,
and Mergers, 544 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, TAX 205, 252-54 (2002), available at www.west
law.com.
142. Beyer, supra note 30 (citing 29 U.S.C. 1362 (1994)).
143. Keating, supra note 121, at 825-26. A control group is "a group of trades or businesses
under 'common control."' Terry A.M. Mumford, Retirement, Deferred Compensation, and Wel-
fare Plans of Tax-Exempt and Government Employers, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION 11, 43 (2004) available at www.westlaw.
corn (quoting ERISA, § 3(40)(B)(ii)). According to PBGC standards, trades or businesses are
under common control "if they are 'two or more trades or businesses under common control' as
defined in regulations prescribed under section 414(c) of the [Internal Revenue] Code." Id.
(quoting 26 C.F.R. § 1.414(c)-2).
144. Keating, supra note 121, at 826.
145. Beyer, supra note 30 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (2004); I.R.C. § 412 (2004)).
146. Keating, supra note 121, at 826.
147. Beyer, supra note 30 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1082(f) (2004); I.R.C. § 412(n) (2004)).
148. Keating, supra note 121, at 827.
149. Uylaki, supra note 41, at 94-95.
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"stays 'any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property
of the estate."' 150 The effect of these provisions is that in most cases,
the PBGC cannot file a lien because the employer typically does not
file a plan termination until bankruptcy. 151 The lien that arises auto-
matically for unpaid funding contributions encounters the same prob-
lem with the stay provision because the lien must be perfected before
bankruptcy to be effective. 152 Any liens that are not perfected before
the company enters Chapter 11 bankruptcy may not obtain priority
status. 15
3
The recent announcements by United and US Airways that they
will stop paying contributions into their pension plans as required by
ERISA demonstrate this problem. Because the Bankruptcy Code
hampers the PBGC's ability to place a lien on these companies, em-
ployers can continue to violate federal law, virtually without conse-
quence, by not paying the required contributions. 154 Belt argues that
"[p]roviding for an exception to the automatic stay would better en-
able the PBGC to protect the interests of the workers and retirees
that it insures and make it clear that [the PBGC] place[s] a high prior-
ity on meeting pension promises made to workers and retirees."'1 55
Besides resulting in the PBGC's inability to collect the funds from
the delinquent plan sponsors, these provisions may result in another
very disturbing consequence. Both the employer and the PBGC have
incentives to abuse ERISA. An employer, aware of his financial in-
stability and imminent Chapter 11 bankruptcy, may delay terminating
its pension plans until filing for Chapter 11 so that the PBGC's lien
may not be granted priority. 56 In addition, the ability of the PBGC to
impose the lien provides the PBGC with an incentive to force the
company to involuntarily terminate its plan when its finances look
shaky but before the company enters bankruptcy. 157 The PBGC's
forcing involuntary plan termination has some undesired conse-
quences. For example, as a result of involuntary termination, some
companies may be required to downsize,158 and "[t]he mere thought
150. Keating, supra note 121, at 838-39 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1988)).
151. Id. at 839.
152. Id.
153. Uylaki, supra note 41, at 102.
154. Belt testimony, supra note 84.
155. Id.
156. Uylaki, supra note 41, at 105-06.
157. Keating, supra note 114, at 92-94.
158. Wolfe, supra note 3, at 179.
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of forced downsizing of corporations with the most significant un-
derfunding... would send shockwaves throughout the economy. 159
2. Should the PBGC Be Granted Priority Status in Bankruptcy
Proceedings?
In all proposed reforms to the PBGC, one must be mindful of the
ultimate goals of ERISA-to ensure pension benefits while not over-
burdening the benefit system so that employers opt not to offer the
plans at all. There are thus arguments for and against raising the
PBGC's status in bankruptcy. This section examines the additional
security that the raised priority status may afford the PBGC and em-
ployees, and also the disadvantages that may sway some employers to
eliminate defined benefit plans completely. 160
a. Arguments for Raising the PBGC's Priority Status
There are several arguments for raising the PBGC's priority status
in bankruptcy proceedings regardless of whether the PBGC perfected
its liens prior to the company's bankruptcy filing. First, other credi-
tors would have an incentive to monitor the employer's pension
plans.161 As the situation stands, other creditors are generally uncon-
cerned with the company's pension plans because the PBGC's claims
fall below most creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding. 162 Therefore,
the employer may make unrealistic pension promises to employees
and save on current wages in order to meet the demands of other
creditors. 163 If the PBGC had priority in a bankruptcy proceeding,
other creditors' recoveries would be affected, and consequently the
creditors would have an incentive to monitor the abuse of pension
plans.164
Second, allowing the PBGC to have priority status regardless of
when the lien was perfected would be consistent with the original pur-
pose of ERISA and the statutory scheme prior to the enactment of
the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.165 Under ERISA's original language,
and before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, PBGC
liens perfected after a company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy would
159. Id.
160. See infra notes 161-176 and accompanying text.
161. Uylaki, supra note 41, at 106.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 106-07.
164. Id. As Bradley Belt stated, "With such a change, we could expect creditors to encourage
better plan funding to counteract PBGC's strengthened claim in bankruptcy." Belt testimony,
supra note 84.
165. Uylaki, supra note 41, at 100.
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be afforded fourth priority status, similar to "taxes due and owing to
the United States."'1 66 The Bankruptcy Code, which was enacted four
years after ERISA, replaced the phrase "taxes legally due and owing
to the United States" with a more specific list of priorities.167 ER-
ISA's language was not modified, however, and the PBGC's claims
were given eighth-level priority status, which is the priority reserved
for "allowed unsecured claims of governmental units."'1 68 If the liens
had tax priority, the PBGC could assert a secured creditor priority
claim-which is substantially higher than the unsecured creditor status
the PBGC has today.169
Third, there is an argument that basic fairness demands that em-
ployee pension plans receive priority status in a reorganizing bank-
ruptcy.170 Many employees rely solely on their pensions for
retirement and have made concessions in the form of wage reductions
to preserve their pension benefits. 171 Their pensions should be secure,
and the federal agency that provides this security should be given a
priority when the courts are deciding which creditors to satisfy.
b. Arguments Against Raising Priority Status
As with reforms to increased premiums, some argue that raising the
PBGC's priority status does not solve the root of the problem. 172 Be-
166. Id. at 99. "ERISA provides, 'In a case under Title 11 or in insolvency proceedings, the
lien imposed under subsection (a) of this section shall be treated in the same manner as a tax due
and owing to the United States for purposes of Title 11 or Section 3713 of Title 31.'" Id. at 97
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 1368(c)(2) (1994)) (emphasis omitted).
167. Id.
168. Id. Many argue, however, that because Congress failed to update ERISA correspond-
ingly, Congress intended to lower the priority status of the PBGC's claims. Id.
169. Daniels, supra note 3, at 90.
170. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 5.
171. For example, in 2003, the United Airline International Association of Machinists (IAM)
agreed to wage givebacks ranging from six to seven percent and forfeited the first four days of
vacation pay through 2007. Todd Neff, United Union Chiefs Say Cuts Crucial, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS, Nov. 25, 2002, at 4A, available at www.lexisnexis.com. In return for these concessions,
United employees were promised future benefits, including a seven percent increase in pension
benefits for employees retiring after November 2004. Id. US Airways also used pension benefits
to secure wage concessions from its employees. Kirstin Downey, Airlines' Pension Problems
Growing; Industry's Woes Seen in Shortfalls, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2003, at El. Jerrold Glass,
Senior Vice President for Employee Relations at US Airways, informed the US Airways' ma-
chinist union that the union's pension plan would not be terminated if the union ratified a pro-
posed wage concession contract. Id. The union agreed, and the pension plans were not
terminated at that time. Id. This promise, however, was not kept. In September of 2004, in the
midst of US Airways' second bankruptcy proceeding, the airline failed to make a $110 million
payment to its pension plan, thereby completing a first step towards terminating its pension plan
altogether. Francine Knowles, United Union Asks Congress To Protect Pension Plans, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2004, at 71.
172. Wolfe, supra note 3, at 179.
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cause the PBGC places a cap on the amount of benefits retirees can
receive, having the PBGC take over a plan is not necessarily in the
best interests of the employees. 73 As one commentator has noted,
"[T]he long-term solution of the PBGC's woes lies in funding pension
promises, thereby, making priority in bankruptcy extraneous. ' ' 174 For
example, this solution does not help the PBGC's claims against a com-
pany in nonbankruptcy liquidation because
[miost firms that liquidate do so without ever filing a bankruptcy
petition. WAile it is true that the PBGC's largest claims will proba-
bly be against companies that become debtors under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, several of the agency's most substantial
reimbursement claims were against companies that were not in
bankruptcy.1 75
Finally, it would be difficult to obtain congressional approval for
this solution. As one commentator noted:
Elliot [President of COFFI] thinks [this solution is] unlikely, how-
ever. "That would require the Judiciary Committees of the two
Houses to change the Code, and it's not clear that they feel a strong
motivation to do it." He adds that, it would be difficult economi-
cally either for the creditors, if it takes effect immediately, or given
a long lead time, for the companies, because creditors will look at
pension underfunding the same way they look at enormous amounts
of secured debt.176
Given the urgency of the airline crisis and the potential pensions the
PBGC will have to shoulder, it is important that any proposed reform
is one that can have an immediate effect.
3. The PBGC Should Have Administrative Priority Status
If the PBGC's priority status in bankruptcy is raised, the PBGC
should be granted administrative priority status.177 Section 503 of the
Bankruptcy Code governs administrative priority status. 178 Adminis-
trative priority is granted to claimants who can demonstrate that their
claims: "(i) arose from a post-petition transaction with the debtor; and
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Keating, supra note 114, at 92 (citing Retiree Health Benefits: The Fair Weather Promise:
Hearings Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong. 65 (1986) (statement of Douglas G.
Baird (Professor of Law)); R. IPPOLITO, THE ECONOMICS OF PENSION INSURANCE 42 (1989);
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Di-
verse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bank-
ruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 102 (1984)).
176. Who Will Rescue the PBGC?, supra note 84.
177. Hazan et al., supra note 51, at 503-06.
178. Id. at 503.
[Vol. 55:169
2005] AIRLINES IN DISTRESS
(ii) resulted in direct benefit to the estate.' 79 The PBGC has argued
that it is entitled to this status because its Unfunded Benefits Liability
Claim and its Minimum Funding Contribution Claim, both post-peti-
tion transactions, are "actual and necessary costs of preserving the es-
tate. 180 Alternatively, the PBGC has argued that it should be
granted administrative priority because both its claims should be con-
sidered the equivalent of a tax under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(I). l81
This component of the PBGC's argument is based on § 4068 of ER-
ISA, which states that in "a case under [T]itle 11 of the United States
Code or in an insolvency proceeding, the lien imposed . . . shall be
treated in the same manner as a tax due and owing to the United
States." 182
179. Id. (citing the test articulated in In re Mammoth Mart, Inc., 536 F.2d 950, 954 (1st Cir.
1976)).
180. Id. The courts, however, rejected this position in In re Chateaugay Corp., 115 B.R. 760,
772 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). There the court "held that the PBGC's claim was not entitled to
administrative priority because it both arose from pre-petition transactions with the debtor and
did not provide any direct benefit to the estate." Hazan et al., supra note 51, at 503. This deci-
sion found the "triggering event" of the claim was the labor of the employees, not the termina-
tion of the plan. Id. (quoting In re Chateaugay Corp., 115 B.R. at 774). Therefore, there is a
recognized argument for granting the PBGC administrative priority, but it is contrary to current
case law.
181. Id. at 504. Section 503(b)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code allows taxes owed to the United
States to have administrative priority in a bankruptcy proceeding. Id.
182. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1368(c)(2) (1987)). This argument has been rejected by most
courts. For example, in In re Kent Plastics, 183 B.R. 841 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1995), the court found
that this argument was not supported by subsequent legislative treatment of ERISA. The court
stated:
On March 24, 1992, Representative Robert H. Michel (R-Ill.) introduced a bill, The
Pension Security Act of 1992, [H.R. 4545, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.] .which is designed to
award tax priority status to certain pre-petition claims of the PBGC that arose post-
petition. An identical companion bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator Robert
Dole (R-Kan.) on March 26, 1992 [S. 2485, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.]. No action was taken
and the legislation died with the 102d Congress.
In re Kent Plastics, 183 B.R. at 846 n.1. The court concluded by "adopt[ing] the logic of that line
of cases holding that an ERISA claim is not synonymous with a federal tax claim under 29
U.S.C. § 1368(c)." Id. Another reason that courts reject this argument is because Section
507(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code lists several kinds of taxes that should be granted administra-
tive priority, including: "(1) income taxes for return taxee within the past three years; (2) prop-
erty taxes payable within one year of petition; (3) trust fund taxes; (4) employment taxes within
three years of petition; (5) excise taxes within three years; (6) custom duties; and (7) tax penal-
ties." Hazan et al., supra note 51, at 505 n.10 (citing In re Kent Plastics, 181 B.R. at 847). Be-
cause neither the PBGC nor ERISA is specifically listed, most courts have refrained from
designating the PBGC status under this section. Id.
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C. The "Ideal" Solution Is Raising the PBGC's
Priority Status in Bankruptcy
Of the two solutions-modifying premiums and raising the PBGC's
status in bankruptcy-the latter proposal best solves the PBGC's cur-
rent crisis and ensures the PBGC's future viability. This section con-
siders the components of an ideal solution and explains why elevated
bankruptcy status better meets its criteria. 183
1. Components of the Ideal Solution
Although both solutions have their critics, giving the PBGC a
higher priority status is a better solution to save the PBGC from insol-
vency because it better fits the components of an "ideal solution." 184
The ideal solution would: (1) allow a company's effective reorganiza-
tion; (2) prevent or eliminate moral hazards that encourage abuses of
the PBGC's insurance; (3) minimize or eliminate factors that distort a
company's behavior; (4) minimize or eliminate factors that distort an
employee's behavior; and (5) encourage employers to continue using
defined benefit plans.18 5
a. The Ideal Solution Would Allow Corporate Reorganization
First, the ideal solution would allow a company undergoing a Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy to reorganize effectively so that it will stay in busi-
ness while protecting the interests of the employees. "When
bankruptcy law improves the chances that viable businesses will sur-
vive financial distress as going concerns, it indirectly benefits employ-
ees of those businesses. Conversely, if Congress moves in directions
that make successful reorganizations more difficult to achieve, em-
ployees as a group are likely to suffer. '186 That is, legislation that
makes it easier for a company to survive Chapter 11 bankruptcy will
ultimately benefit the employees of that company.
183. See infra notes 184-213 and accompanying text.
184. The "ideal solution" is a compilation of important issues that this author argues any
solution must address.
185. These components of the "ideal solution" are not listed in any particular order.
186. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 13. Making reorganization easier to achieve indirectly bene-
fits employees because the company's management is able to prioritize obtaining the additional
resources to ensure the company's long-term survival. Id. This directly benefits employees by
ensuring that they will continue to receive wages. Id. at 14.
[Vol. 55:169
2005] AIRLINES IN DISTRESS 197
b. The Ideal Solution Would Prevent Moral Hazards
Second, the ideal solution would prevent the "moral hazard" inher-
ent in ERISA today. 187 A moral hazard is a flaw in the system that
actually provides an incentive to engage in improper behavior.188
Modifying the premium structure and giving the PBGC a priority in
bankruptcy address different moral hazards.189
In the context of the premium structure, a company having financial
difficulty may increase pension benefits to its employees in lieu of in-
creasing the current salaries of its employees. 190 The company cur-
rently can increase its benefits without paying more in premiums. 191
Alternatively, the company may take financial risks at the expense of
its pension plans.192 But, if the company must ultimately dissolve, the
PBGC and other healthy companies paying premiums shoulder the
responsibility for paying the dissolving company's pension benefits. 193
Although the employees may not receive the full amount of the prom-
ised pensions, by this time, the plan has ceased to be the problem of
the employer. Thus, the employer can pay low premiums while mis-
managing its funds. The low premiums paid by the airlines is an ex-
ample. As Executive Director Belt stated:
[W]hile United's credit rating has been junk bond status and its pen-
sions underfunded by more than $5 billion on a termination basis
since at least 2000, it has paid just $50 million in premiums to the
insurance program. Yet the termination of United's plans would re-
sult in a loss to the fund of more than $6 billion.194
187. Belt statement, supra note 73.
188. Id. As Belt explained,
A properly designed insurance system has various mechanisms for encouraging respon-
sible behavior that will lessen the likelihood of incurring a loss and discouraging risky
behavior that heightens the prospects of claims. That is why banks have risk-based
capital standards, why drivers with poor driving records face higher premiums, why
smokers pay more for life insurance than non-smokers, and why homeowners with
smoke detectors get lower rates than those without.
Belt testimony, supra note 84.
189. There are those who argue the current system is a "moral hazard" for employees as well.
"In the absence of the PBGC, employees would have every reason to use what power they had
to prevent their company from underfunding its pension plan." Keating, supra note 114, at 75.
Because, however, the employees are cognizant that if the company terminates their pension
plans their pensions are paid by the PBGC, employees have little incentive to monitor the fund-
ing levels of the plans. Id. This argument will not be addressed as it is outside the scope of this
Comment.
190. Belt testimony, supra note 84.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. It should be noted that airlines are not the only industry subject to this moral hazard.
"This subsidization extends across industry sectors-to date, the steel and airline industries have
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The moral hazard inherent in not allowing the PBGC to have prior-
ity status in a bankruptcy arises for many of the same reasons. Again,
a company can engage in risky behavior-underfunding its plans and
raising pension benefits in exchange for wage concessions-without
much consequence. A company is only responsible to secured credi-
tors.195 Because the PBGC's claim will be unsecured, neither the
debtor-company nor the company's secured creditors have an incen-
tive to ensure that the company adequately funds its pension plans. 196
c. The Ideal Solution Would Minimize Distortions
Third, the ideal solution would minimize distortions on the behavior
of the debtor company and the PBGC. That is, the company and the
PBGC should make decisions affecting the pension plans in terms of
what would ultimately be in the best interests of the company.
Under the current system, the premium structure does not have
much effect on the behavior of the debtor company or the PBGC.
The premium structure has a minimal impact on behavior because: (1)
premiums are so low regardless of whether the company pays accord-
ing to the flat-rate or the variable-rate, and (2) the company is obliged
to pay premiums regardless of the state of funding of its pension
plans.197
Conversely, the current system distorts behavior due to the PBGC's
low status in bankruptcy. As mentioned previously, the fact that the
PBGC's liens have low priority in bankruptcy gives the debtor com-
pany an incentive to enter bankruptcy to minimize the PBGC's
claims. 198 On the other side of the coin, the PBGC has an incentive to
force a debtor company to involuntarily terminate its plan before
bankruptcy so that the PBGC can maximize its claim on the com-
pany's assets. 199 Ideally, neither the decision to enter bankruptcy pre-
maturely nor the decision to compel termination of a plan should be
based on the size of the PBGC's claims on a company's assets.
accounted for more than 70% of PBGC's claims by dollar amount while covering less than 5%
of the insured base." Id.
195. Keating, supra note 114, at 77.
196. Id. at 76.
197. All companies must pay a basic flat-rate premium of nineteen dollars per participant.
Premiums, supra note 36. Companies maintaining underfunded pensions must pay an additional
variable-rate premium of nine dollars per $1,000 of unfunded vested benefits. Id.
198. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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d. The Ideal Solution Would Not Affect Employees' Decisions
Another element of the ideal solution is that the employee's deci-
sion regarding how to take his or her retirement benefits would not be
affected. When ERISA was enacted in the 1970s, most employees
opted to take their retirement benefits in designated payments that
were distributed each month.200 Today, in contrast, over fifty percent
of retiring employees are able to take their pension in a lump sum, an
option that a large majority of retirees exercise.201 According to one
study, eighty-nine percent of all employees with the option to receive
lump sum pensions do so.202 The reason that more employees are ex-
ercising this option is because they believe that if the plan terminates
such that the PBGC has to take over, they will receive fewer bene-
fits. 20 3 This exacerbates the plan's underfunding because money is
taken out sooner than anticipated, and thus cannot gain value as an
investment for the company.20 4
e. The Ideal Solution Does Not Discourage Employers from Using
Defined Benefit Plans
Finally, it is important that any reform designed to add stability to
defined benefit plans does not discourage employers from using these
types of plans.205 ERISA's enactment recognized the balance be-
tween security and attractiveness to employers. That is, the more se-
cure the plan, the more the employer must pay upfront-which, in
turn, makes the plan less attractive. 20 6 The ideal reform must also
tread this careful balance. Because employers do have other options
when selecting pension plans, any proposed reform must be cognizant
of the threshold beyond which defined benefit plans become so oner-
ous that employers may decide not to offer these plans at all.
2. Raising Priority Status Is the Ideal Solution
Although both solutions-modifying the premium structure and
raising the PBGC's status in bankruptcy-would effectuate some ele-
ments of the ideal solution, the latter solution would most likely effec-
tuate more of these elements. First, although both proposed reforms
200. Elliot, supra note 26, at 2.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 11.
203. Id.
204. Walker statement, supra note 13.
205. See supra note 50 and accompanying text for a list of the advantages of defined benefit
plans over other kinds of plans such as defined contribution plans. This Comment assumes that
defined benefit plans should remain a viable pension plan offered by employers.
206. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for Congress's goals in enacting ERISA.
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would enable troubled companies to emerge from Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy, granting the PBGC a priority status may better achieve this
goal. Imposing higher premiums on an already financially-troubled
company would only add an additional expense to the company, and
perhaps ensure its ultimate dissolution.20 7 On the other hand, giving
the PBGC a priority in the short-term may hurt a company's reorgani-
zation, but in the long run, the priority status may not be such an
obstacle to reorganization. The debtor-company and other creditors
would be aware of the PBGC's priority status and thus the company
will have an incentive to manage its own finances in a responsible way
such that the PBGC's claim will not scare off its other creditors.208
Similarly, giving the PBGC priority status reduces the moral hazard
more effectively than modifying premiums. Modifying the premium
structure is a limited solution, because premiums can increase only to
a certain point before employers are discouraged from establishing or
continuing defined benefit plans.209 Moreover, even if the premiums
only increase for companies at high risk for bankruptcy, it can be ar-
gued that raising their premiums may actually force the company into
bankruptcy. Giving the PBGC priority status, however, would not
have this detrimental effect. Although companies currently undergo-
ing bankruptcy would face immediate hardship because of their obli-
gations to their creditors, the PBGC's elevated status would avoid this
moral hazard in the long run.210 In fact, if the PBGC's priority status
was raised, companies would actually have an incentive to plan more
effectively, because creditors would not be willing to extend loans to
the company if there was a large outstanding obligation to pension
funds.211
Third, both solutions could potentially negatively affect a com-
pany's behavior. There is a threshold at which premium rates become
207. High costs are particularly troublesome for airlines because of the instability of the oil
industry. The year 2004 was "supposed to be the year that airlines recovered" from the losses
incurred in the post-September 11 economy. The Impact of Federal Pensions and Bankruptcy
Policy on the Financial Health of the Airline Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com-
merce, Sci., and Transp., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg), available at
www.lexisnexis.com. However, "skyrocketing oil prices have shattered that optimism." Id. It is
uncertain what the costs of oil will be in the future. Id. Thus, one could argue that any addi-
tional costs to a struggling airline, in combination with high oil prices, may be too much in
expenses and hinder the airline's recovery.
208. Uylaki, supra note 41, at 106. For example, companies will have a greater incentive not
to drastically underfund their plans because creditors, wary of the PBGC's claim in bankruptcy,
will be less willing to extend funds to high-risk companies. Id.
209. See supra note 50 and accompanying text for a discussion on the advantages of defined
benefit plans.
210. Uylaki, supra note 41, at 106-07.
211. Id.
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so high that companies cease to offer defined benefit plans. It may
also be true that a company's obligations to the PBGC may be so
onerous because of the PBGC's priority status that a company decides
not to offer defined benefit plans. But, raising priority status would
probably prevent other companies with existing defined benefit plans
from terminating their plans arbitrarily, as United has done. For ex-
ample, one may speculate whether United would have terminated its
plan in July 2004 if United knew it would still be liable to the PBGC
for the amount it owed. At the same time United said that it would
not pay the $500 million a year it owed to its pension plans, United
committed to pay the same amount to the City of Chicago for the
city's plan to rebuild O'Hare Airport.212 If the PBGC had been able
to effectuate a lien against United, perhaps United would not have
committed its funds to another source.
Fourth, it is more likely that raising the PBGC's status in bank-
ruptcy would have less of an effect on employee behavior. Again,
modifying the premium structure is, at best, a limited solution. How-
ever, elevating the PBGC's status in bankruptcy would give the com-
pany and its creditors a strong incentive to manage its pension fund
properly. If the pension fund is managed properly, it is more likely
that the company will not terminate its plan. This added security may
influence more employees to opt not to take their pensions in a lump
sum, thereby preserving the solvency of the plan.
Finally, both solutions may discourage companies from using de-
fined benefit plans. Any reform that benefits the PBGC necessarily
means that companies using the plans will be held to higher standards.
In this sense, modifying the premium structure, a milder reform, is
probably less likely to turn away companies. The PBGC-if allowed a
claim in bankruptcy-would have quite a large claim in many cases.213
Companies would be cognizant of this possibility, and may be less
likely to adopt defined benefit plans.
For these reasons, the most effective solution would be to raise the
PBGC's status in bankruptcy. This solution would best achieve the
ultimate goals Congress envisioned in enacting ERISA-companies
would have incentives to ensure that their pension plans are secure,
212. The Impact of Federal Pensions and Bankruptcy Policy on the Financial Health of the
Airline Industry: Hearing on the Impact of Fed. Pensions and Bankr. Policy Before the S. Comm.
of Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Sen. Peter Fitzgerald) available
at www.lexisnexis.com.
213. For example, the PBGC would have a claim of $6.4 billion against United. Geisel, supra
note 25.
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and the burden of pensions in financially troubled companies would
not fall on taxpayers.
IV. IMPACT: THE PBGC AND RAISED PRIORITY STATUS IN
BANKRUPTCY IN THE CURRENT AIRLINE INDUSTRY CRISIS
By examining the impact of raising the PBGC's status in bankruptcy
in light of the current airline situation, it becomes apparent that this
reform would benefit the PBGC without unfairly burdening the air-
line industry. If the PBGC's status in bankruptcy was raised, it would
benefit the PBGC by encouraging better planning by employers and
by allowing the agency to collect the funds owed by the company.
Most companies, aware of the pension liability and the consequences
of terminating their plans, would be able to fund their plans more ap-
propriately without undue burden.
This section first examines the status quo and the future of the air-
lines and the PBGC without the implementation of any reform.2 14
Because the PBGC is heading toward bankruptcy, it is apparent that
reform is necessary. This section next analyzes how raising the
PBGC's status in bankruptcy will affect the status quo and the future
of the airline industry.2 15 This section will focus on United's bank-
ruptcy. It will also examine the effect of this proposed reform on the
other airlines with defined benefit plans that are in or on the brink of
bankruptcy.
A. The Future of the Airlines and the PBGC
Without ERISA Reform
The PBGC is heading for bankruptcy. The PBGC does not have
the assets to cover current and future obligations and is operating at a
dramatically increasing deficit. In 2003, the PBGC had a deficit of
$11.2 billion and in 2004, its deficit grew to $23.3 billion.216 Further-
more, the PBGC is not taking in enough to cover its projected future
obligations. Last year, the PBGC received premiums of only $1.5 bil-
lion, and it expects to receive $2.3 billion this year.21 7 Many experts
have contended, however, that this amount is "nowhere near enough
to cover the large losses it has recently experienced due to the failures
of big pension plans in the steel and airline industries and other sec-
214. See infra notes 216-222 and accompanying text.
215. See infra notes 223-249 and accompanying text.
216. Strengthen Funding for Single-Employer Pension Plans, U.S. Department of Labor, at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/SEPproposal2.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
217. Mary Williams Walsh, Higher Premiums to Insure Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at
A21.
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tors. '2 18 For example, COFFI predicts that the PBGC will become
bankrupt by 2020.219 If the airline industry continues on its current
course, it is almost certain to overburden the already financially
strained pension agency. United Airlines and US Airways have al-
ready terminated their pension plans.220 Delta Air Lines, now in
bankruptcy, has six billion dollars in unfunded pension liabilities.221
Similarly, Northwest Airlines, also in bankruptcy, has $3.7 billion in
unfunded liabilities.2 22 Thus, it is probable that the PBGC's very sur-
vival would be threatened if it assumed the pensions of the airline
industry without any reform.
B. The Future of the Airlines If the PBGC's Status
in Bankruptcy Is Raised
If the PBGC's status in bankruptcy were raised, the PBGC would
have better access to funding if it were forced to assume responsibility
for a company's pension plans. Moreover, an examination of the ap-
plication of this reform to the airline industry demonstrates that this
reform would meet many of the components advocated in the "ideal
solution"-this reform would allow for a company's reorganization,
prevent the moral hazard currently inherent in the system, and dis-
courage distortions in employer and employee behavior.
1. Ensuring Successful Reorganization
If United had to recognize the PBGC as a priority debtor, United's
reorganization would potentially be jeopardized.223 When United an-
nounced it would cease payments to its pension plans in August 2004,
it was motivated in large part by its reorganization strategy.224 United
218. Id.
219. Barbara Rose, Unkept Promises Hit Retirees, CH. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2005, at C1.
220. Press Release, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, PBGC Takes $2.3 Billion Pension
Loss from US Airways (Feb. 2, 2005), at http://www.pbgc.gov/media/news-archive/2005/pr5_22.
html; Press Release, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (Mar. 11, 2005), at http://www/pbgc.
gov/medialnews-archive/2005lpr5_30.html.
221. Caroline Daniel, Executives in Doubt on Pensions, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2005, at 28.
222. Id.
223. This Comment assumes that the raised premium reform, if enacted, would be applied to
United. There is the possibility that the reform would have a "grandfather clause" that would
exempt United, as United's bankruptcy began before the reform was enacted. A "grandfather
clause" is a clause that would allow an individual who is already acting in a certain manner to
continue his behavior, even after the legislature has determined that the action should be ceased.
Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, If Your Grandfather Could Pollute, So Can You: Environmental
"Grandfather Clauses" And Their Role In Environmental Inequity, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 131, 132
(1997).
224. Erik Huey, PBGC Files $8.3 Billion Claim for United Pensions, AIR TRANSPORT INTELLI-
GENCE, Aug. 13, 2004, available at www.lexisnexis.com. "The carrier says: 'Our amended DIP
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hoped that by shedding its pension plans, it would be able to attract
the financing necessary to assure the company's successful reorganiza-
tion.22 5 Therefore, if United was still liable for its pension plans,
United's current reorganization plan would be in jeopardy.
But, if airlines had more responsibility for their pension plans, fu-
ture airlines contemplating bankruptcy would not be able to bargain
with creditors to terminate their pension plans and would have an in-
centive to reduce other expenses before terminating their pension
plan benefits. For example, American Airlines has recently begun to
reevaluate some of its smaller expenses. 226 It has announced that it
will no longer provide pillows on most domestic flights.227 While this
is a relatively small expense,22 8 "these smaller savings add up."'229
More importantly, this attitude reflects the reality that a company may
reduce many unnecessary expenses-both large and small-before
terminating pension plans. If other expenses can be reduced instead
of pension plans, companies would be able to emerge from bank-
ruptcy successfully, and less of the burden of the pension plans would
fall on the PBGC.
2. Preventing Moral Hazards
As the situation stands now, many airlines with defined benefit pen-
sions have severely underfunded plans. 230 United's plans were un-
derfunded by $8.3 billion.231 Similarly, Delta Air Lines's plan is
underfunded by $5.8 billion, 232 while US Airways' plan is un-
facility provides us with critical liquidity, flexibility and stability as we continue our restructuring
work and pursue exit financing without a federal loan guarantee." Id.
225. A representative for United has said that "[defaulting on pensions] also gives us the time
... to formulate a business plan that will attract the exit financing to take us out of bankruptcy."
Id. That is, United has jettisoned its pension plans in an attempt to appease creditors. Caroline
Daniel, More Pain as UAL Plans Another 6,000 Job Cuts, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2004, at 19.
226. American Airlines Removes Pillows, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2005, at D3.
227. Id.
228. American Airlines "saved $300,000 a year by removing the pillows from MD-80s, and
expects to save $370,000 more by expanding the move." Id.
229. Id.
230. Older companies tend to have defined benefit plans, while younger airlines, like South-
west Airlines, JetBlue Airways, and AirTran Airways are more likely to have defined contribu-
tion plans. Eric Torbenson, Struggling with the Load: Cash Strapped Airlines Are Dragging down
the Pension System, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 16, 2005, at ID, available at www.lexisnexis.
com.
231. Marilyn Geewax, Taxpayers Could Face Huge Bills for Airline Pensions, Cox NEWS SER-
VICE, Aug. 25, 2004, available at www.lexisnexis.com.
232. Brian Tumulty, Private Sector Faces Pension Woes, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 18,
2005, available at www.lexisnexis.com.
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derfunded by $2.5 billion.233 If companies were liable for their pen-
sion plans in bankruptcy, there would be a strong deterrent against
such rampant underfunding. Alternatively, if a company had an un-
derfunded plan and entered bankruptcy, it would still be liable for its
promised pensions.
Moreover, another moral hazard inherent in the current system oc-
curs when companies use the threat of bankruptcy as leverage when
bargaining with employees. For example, in August 2004, US Airways
was seeking concessions in the range of $750 million from its employ-
ees.234 In a letter to employees, Bruce Lakefield, the Chief Executive
Officer of US Airways, mentioned bankruptcy as an option that the
company was facing, and hoped that the company could win the nec-
essary concessions from employees to avoid this possibility.235 Al-
though companies would still be able to use the threat of bankruptcy
to gain concessions from their employees, the threat would have less
force if the PBGC had priority status. That is, an employer would be
less likely to use the threat of bankruptcy as a method to negotiate
with employees, because if the employer entered bankruptcy, it would
still be liable to the PBGC.
3. Minimizing Distortions
Raising the PBGC's priority status would minimize behavioral dis-
tortions by ensuring that airlines would not enter bankruptcy solely to
avoid pension liabilities. Although United did not enter Chapter 11
bankruptcy to terminate its pension plans, that was the ultimate re-
sult.236 But, once it became apparent that United could unilaterally
233. David Field, United Targets Pensions; As It Struggles to Emerge from Bankruptcy, United
Airlines Has Brought to Centre Stage the Most Burdensome Legacy Affecting the Major U.S.
Airlines: Their Pension Liabilities, AIRLINE Bus., Sept. 1, 2004, at 15, available at www.lexisnexis.
com. Some have argued that the total underfunding of airlines pension plans might have even
been as high as $31 billion in 2003. Torbenson, supra note 230. If one looks outside of the airline
context, the underfunding picture is even more grim. "Employers that sponsor traditional pri-
vate-sector pensions had a collective funding shortfall estimated of $450 billion last year, accord-
ing to pension industry estimates." Tumulty, supra note 232.
234. Lou Whiteman, Delta, US Air Face Key Stretch, THE DEAL, Aug. 23, 2004, available at
www.lexisnexis.com.
235. Id. Furthermore, employees are dissatisfied by the ability of employers to use the bank-
ruptcy process to avoid pension obligations. Currently, employees at United are fed up and
prepared to take drastic actions-such as striking-to protect their pension plans. Al Swanson,
Analysis: Air Unions on Rollercoaster Ride, UPI, Jan. 7, 2005, at www.lexisnexis.com. Greg
Davidowich, the president of the Association of Flight Attendants Master Executive Council at
United, commented that, "United flight attendants have spoken loudly and clearly: they will not
allow their employer to exploit the bankruptcy process and strip them of their rights. They are
ready to fight." Id.
236. David Armstrong, United Mechanics Rebuff Airline Offer; Union Members Vote Down
Wage-Cut Plan, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 29, 2005, at C1, available at www.lexisnexis.com.
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stop payments to its pension plans without recourse because of bank-
ruptcy protections, US Airways also terminated its plans.237 Some ex-
perts predict that other airlines will soon follow suit in order to stay
competitive. 238
If, however, the PBGC was given priority status in bankruptcy,
there would be no reason for a company to enter bankruptcy to avoid
its pension obligations. Bankruptcy would no longer result in the
elimination of pension plan obligations. Furthermore, because air-
lines in bankruptcy would not have an unfair advantage over their
nonbankrupt competitors, healthy airlines would not have to make
changes to their pension plans to stay competitive.
4. Affecting Employee Decisions
As the situation currently stands, most employees take their pen-
sion benefits in lump sums whenever possible.239 If employees fear
that the PBGC will eventually take over the plan, most employees will
continue this trend, because the PBGC pays out fewer benefits than
the employer may have promised. 240 Fewer employees would take
lump sum pensions, however, if terminating pension plans became less
attractive to employers.
This result would greatly alleviate the problems faced by airlines
when their employees take benefits as lump sum payments. For ex-
ample, almost 30% of Delta's pilots-2,000 of 6,900 pilots-are cur-
rently eligible to retire.241 These workers have the option of taking
half of their retirement benefits in a lump sum payment.242 Pilots
fearing bankruptcy and its effects on their pensions are thus retiring at
a high rate-up to 300 pilots are retiring each month.243 This has the
negative effects of decreasing Delta's eligible workforce while reduc-
ing payments into the airline's pension plans.244
237. Swanson, supra note 235.
238. Torbenson, supra note 230. Delta Air Lines, now in bankruptcy, is a prime example.
Geewax, supra note 231. Delta has lost over $5.6 billion over the past three years. Id. Some
experts expect that the pension crisis may snowball so that even relatively healthy airlines, such
as Northwest Airlines, Continental Airlines, and American Airlines, will have to cut their pen-
sion plans. Whiteman, supra note 234.
239. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
241. Field, supra note 233.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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5. Use of Defined Benefit Plans
One possible drawback of raising the PBGC's status in bankruptcy
may be that less airline employers will be inclined to use defined ben-
efit plans. Defined benefit plans are already more costly to administer
than defined contribution plans, and this has led some airlines to con-
vert their defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans. For ex-
ample, United has announced that it would like to change its plans,
and in furtherance of this goal has asked a bankruptcy judge to over-
turn existing collective bargaining agreements. 245 Similarly, Delta
Airlines, with the agreement of the pilots' association, froze the de-
fined benefit plan and established a new defined contribution plan for
future benefits.246
This is not, however, the inevitable result of raising the PBGC's sta-
tus in bankruptcy. There is an argument that the current airline crisis
was not caused by pension plans, as evidenced by the fact that even
airlines that have defined contribution plans, like ATA Airlines, are in
financial trouble.247 Therefore, companies should examine other is-
sues, such as high fuel costs, if they hope to solve their financial
difficulties. 248
In fact, some have even asserted that defined benefit plans are bet-
ter for airlines. Ralph Kruger, the pension committee head for the
Allied Pilots Association, has advocated that defined benefit pensions
are cheaper for airlines because "[y]ou end up spending less over time
for the same benefit."2 49
Raising the PBGC's status in bankruptcy is the best solution to pre-
serve the PBGC's solvency. This solution would solve many of the
issues inherent in the status quo, and allow for employees' protection
in future years. This solution would also make clear that pensions
must be a priority for an employer, and that it is not acceptable for an
entire industry to disregard their employees and shift the burden of
paying pensions to the PBGC.
245. Armstrong, supra note 236.
246. Torbenson, supra note 230.
247. Caroline Daniel, Old-style Carriers Learn How to Play Catch-up: Caroline Daniel Looks
at How Traditional Airlines Are Successfully Grappling with High Costs, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2005,
at 24. For example, only three low-cost carriers-Southwest Airlines, JetBlue Airlines, and Air-
Tran Airways-reported a net profit in 2004. Id. Other low-cost carriers, such as America West
and ATA Airways, have experienced significant financial difficulty in recent years. Id. ATA's
problems were so severe that the airline sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in October
2004. ATA to Sell Chicago Express, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 8, 2005, at C3.
248. Daniel, supra note 247.
249. Torbenson, supra note 230
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V. CONCLUSION
In this era of retiring baby boomers, providing secure pensions must
be one of our nation's top priorities. Thirty years ago, Congress en-
acted ERISA with the intention of ensuring that major employers
could not default on obligations promised to their employees. The
PBGC was developed as a last resort-it was created to provide for
those rare cases in which a company could not pay its employees their
promised pensions.
Now that the PBGC is in financial trouble, Congress must again
step up to the plate and protect this nation's workers. Congress must
reform ERISA so that the PBGC can obtain the necessary funding
from the companies it insures. United illustrates how a company can
currently abuse the PBGC, as well as what reforms are necessary to
prevent future abuses. There are two proposed reforms strongly ad-
vocated by top officials in the PBGC: modification of the premium
structure to more accurately reflect risk, and raising the PBGC's sta-
tus in a bankruptcy proceeding. Though not perfect, both solutions
would provide valid means of increasing the PBGC's revenue. This
Comment proposed components of an ideal solution, and found that
increasing the PBGC's status in bankruptcy would better meet the
components of that ideal solution. Now it is time for Congress to fol-
low suit and pass a reform before the PBGC's debt falls on this na-
tion's taxpayers.
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